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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 18/05/2006 Accident number: 243 
Accident time: 11:30 Accident Date: 08/08/1998 
Where it occurred: Ali Khail BalaTapa 
Village, Jaji, Paktia 
Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Handling accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: POMZ AP frag Ground condition: bushes/scrub 
trees 
Date record created: 17/02/2004 Date  last modified: 17/02/2004 
No of victims: 2 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate training (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
 
Accident report 
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made available in 
September 1999. The following summarises its content. 
1 
The demining group were using a one-man breaching drill with two-man teams at the time of 
the accident. 
Victim No.1 had been a deminer for nine months and Victim No.2 had been a deminer for 
nine years. It was four months since the team had attended a revision course and 52 days 
since their last leave. The team were working on a hillside with "bushes and trees". The 
device was identified from fragments found at the site. The hilltop had been a military post 
and had been protected with four rings of POMZ and a belt of PMNs. The group had found 
"about 10 mines" and destroyed them in situ.  
The investigators determined that at around 11:00 the Section Leader instructed the 
deminers to pack up and rest until the end of the day. While they were resting Victim No.1 
went into the uncleared area for no known reason. When he was 15m into the mined area he 
noticed a tripwire and "started wrapping it into the stick of a POMZ".  A POMZ detonated at 
11:30.  
Victim No.1 died "on the spot". Victim No.2 was 15m away in a safe area and received "a 
fragment on his hand. He was treated at the site and evacuated to hospital in Peshawar, 
Pakistan for further treatment. 
The Team Leader pointed out that the victim was a relatively new and inexperienced 
deminer who ignored his Section Leader. 
The Section Leader stated that he was called to the site after the accident and searched up 
to Victim No.1 with a detector. He thought that a policy of not employing deminers over 40 
years old would prevent recurrence of such incidents. He also thought that new deminers 
should not be deployed in that area, and that no deminers should be deployed there more 
than once "because it is boring". 
Victim No.2 said that Victim No.1 was his partner but his hands trembled too much when he 
was prodding so he did not allow him to prod. He reported having seen his partner sitting in 
the uncleared area and asked what he was doing. Victim No.2 said that he was coming, then 
the mine exploded. [He did not report having seen Victim No.2 deliberately roll up a tripwire.] 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that Victim No.1 was ignorant of safety procedures and caused 
the accident. They thought it likely that he had gone into the area to look for guns. They said 
that there were stories that Kalashnikovs had been found in the area by locals, and that the 
deminers had found ammunition while working. [Presumably the guns had a resale value.] 
They decided that the Section Leader should not have allowed the group to rest in the mined 
area if work was finished for the day and should have monitored the deminers more closely. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that "command groups" enforce technical and safety 
procedures. They thought that Victim No.1 was too old to be a deminer (aged 65) and should 
not have been recruited. They recommended that the Section Leader be disciplined for poor 
performance. 
 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 316 Name: Name removed 
Age: 65 Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: DECEASED 
2 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: none 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
minor Hand 
minor Leg 
severe Arm 
severe Eye 
severe Head 
FATAL 
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
An initial casualty report stated that Victim No.1 had severe chest injury and did not mention 
a head or eye injury. 
The field medical report included a sketch showing that Victim No.1 suffered a deep injury to 
his "eye and brain" and right hand and lower left leg lacerations. 
The site doctor described the injuries as "Deep injury of the left eye and brain. Multiple injury 
of the left arm and fracture (incomplete) and lacerations of the left leg and right hand." 
Photocopies of photographs of Victim No.1 were of a poor quality but appeared to show a 
large fragment strike in and around the left eye.  
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 317 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: none 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
minor Eye 
minor Face 
3 
severe Hands 
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
The field medical report included a medic's sketch showing that Victim No.2 suffered injuries 
to his face, forehead and both hands. The medic treated "eye" damage and dressed the 
other injuries. The site doctor described the injuries as "Puncturated injury of the left hand 
with metacarpus 3,4 and 5 fractures. Puncturated injury of the right hand with fracture of the 
third metacarpus and abrasion of pre-orbital and nose". 
The victim was "evacuated to hospital in Peshawar, Pakistan for further treatment". 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because Victim 
No.1 was allowed to go unsupervised into a mined area and behave with apparent ignorance 
of the risks.  
As the investigators recognised, his error should have been corrected. His training should 
also have prevented such an error occurring. Any failure of training would be a management 
failing - and it is curious that a "new" deminer would be recruited at 65 years old when the 
jobs were apparently in considerable demand. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate 
training”. 
The investigators appear to have been allowing imaginative speculation to influence them 
when they guessed that the victim was in search of guns. The witnesses did not report this 
and no guns had been found by the deminers. The investigators stated that the victim rolled 
up a tripwire and that he was possibly in search of guns without explaining their reasons for 
believing either contention, or explaining how the two could have been consistent with each 
other.  
 
Related papers 
Documents ordering a Board of Inquiry were included in the file. No Board of Inquiry report 
was not on file in the MAC in September 1999. (A BoI was considered essential because of 
the death involved in the accident.)  
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